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Abstract
Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-
B)  is  the  foundation  of  next  generation  air  traffic 
management systems. The precision granted by ADS-B 
will allow for the network to support the huge growth 
in air traffic in the coming decades and assist both air 
traffic  controllers  and  pilots  in  improving  safety  in 
flight.  However,  the  ADS-B  protocol  has  serious 
security vulnerabilities.  Coupled with the importance 
of  ADS-B  in  the  air  transportation  system,  these 
security  issues  make  ADS-B an  appealing  target  for 
attack by adversaries.  This paper dismisses the need 
for  encryption  and  focuses  security  strategies  on 
location verification. Multilateration is combined with 
data  fusion  and  location  tracking  for  effective  and 
undemanding  short-term  and  long-term  location 
verification. By taking input from air traffic controllers, 
a  secondary  location  tracking  systems  allows  for  a 
backup record of controlled aircraft that can easily be 
referred to in emergencies. 
1. Introduction  
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has 
introduced the Next Generation (NextGen) upgrade to 
modernize the U.S. air traffic control system. NextGen 
will be expected to handle the growth of air traffic by 
manned and unmanned aircraft and to improve the 
safety of all passengers. This upgraded system is 
dependent on Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B), which wirelessly generates and 
broadcasts digital messages that contain the GPS 
coordinates of aircraft. Unlike traditional radar 
systems, ADS-B is intended to provide enhanced 
situational awareness by allowing aircraft to provide 
their identity, location, and intent. 
The importance of ADS-B makes it an appealing 
target for attack by adversaries looking to negatively 
affect air traffic systems. ADS-B is made even more 
appealing because it has no built-in security 
countermeasures to prevent adversarial attacks. The 
inherent lack of security measures in the ADS-B 
protocol makes it susceptible to eavesdropping, 
jamming, message injection, message deletion, and 
message modification. [8] 
The majority of proposed security solutions for 
ADS-B center on authentication of messages through 
methods such as public key infrastructure and 
fingerprinting. This paper argues that such message 
authentication techniques are not efficient for use in air 
traffic management and location authentication 
measures should instead be implemented to secure the 
ADS-B data link. Implementation of the location 
authentication strategies of multilateration, data fusion, 
and location tracking would be an alternate method of 
verifying the existence of aircraft in ADS-B data. 
The remainder of this paper will proceed as 
follows: in Section II, problems with ADS-B and 
previously proposed solutions will be covered; in 
Section III, the inefficiency of broadcast authentication 
will be discussed and certain location authentication 
strategies will be dismissed; in Section IV, this paper 
will propose multilateration in combination with data 
fusion and location prediction as short-term and long-
term strategies for verification of ADS-B location; 
finally, Section V concludes this paper with discussion 
of the solution and prospects for future research.  
2. Background and Related Works  
This section defines the problems related to 
security in ADS-B more thoroughly. First, a short 
overview of the currently used ADS-B protocol is 
provided. Building on this, the existing vulnerabilities 
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are outlined. Finally, the solutions proposed by 
previous research studies are identified. 
2.1. ADS-B Overview 
  
ADS-B forms the foundation for the future of air 
traffic management systems, allowing the shift from 
ground radar and navigational aids to precise tracking 
via satellite signals. These broadcasts contain the 
aircraft’s position, velocity, identification, and other air 
traffic management-related information. It allows for 
cost-effective surveillance, cockpit advisory services to 
improve pilots’ situational awareness, and cockpit 
critical services to safely improve air traffic capacity. 
In the ADS-B system architecture, each aircraft 
computes its position and velocity with the help of on-
board GPS then broadcasts this information to ground 
sensor stations and other aircraft at a rate of 1-2 times 
per second. ADS-B is supported by two different data 
links: 1090 MHz Extended Squitter (1090ES) and 
Universal Access Tranceiver (UAT). 1090ES is the 
major data link for scheduled air transportation. For 
purposes of air traffic management, ground sensor 
stations receive an aircraft’s messages and forward 
them to air traffic control facilities. Surrounding 
aircraft with the proper equipment can receive these 
same messages, either forwarded by the ground sensor 
station or directly received from the transmitting 
aircraft. 
2.2. Problems with ADS-B 
  
The current version of ADS-B’s data link has 
serious security concerns. These vulnerabilities are 
inherent to the nature of broadcasting over radio 
frequencies. Strohmeier et al. [8] define the possible 
attacks that ADS-B is susceptible to: 
Eavesdropping: This passive attack consists of 
listening in on unsecured broadcast transmissions. This 
is the easiest attack to carry out and has long been 
acknowledged due to the inherent nature of ADS-B 
broadcasting unsecured messages over radio 
frequencies.  
Jamming: Jamming is a problem common to all 
wireless communication. However, the effect of a 
jamming attack on ground station or aircraft receivers 
is particularly serious, considering the importance and 
criticality of the transmitted data. The inability of air 
traffic control to track aircraft would create severe 
problems in the transportation network. 
Message Injection: Message injection consists of 
adding fake transmissions to the air traffic 
communication system. As demonstrated by 
researchers at Black Hat 2012 [2], injecting imposter 
messages is simple and cheap. This attack can be 
scaled formidably to f lood the a i r t raff ic 
communication system with “ghost” aircraft 
transmitting false information. 
Message Deletion: Legitimate messages sent by 
aircraft or ground stations can be “deleted” by 
transmitting the inverse of the signal (destructive 
interference) or causing a large enough number of bit 
errors for the receiver to classify the message as 
corrupt and drop it (constructive interference). 
Message deletion can make it look like an aircraft has 
disappeared. 
Message Modification: The most complex attack to 
pursue, message modification can be carried out by 
sending a high-powered signal to replace part or all of 
a legitimate message, or switching any number of bits 
in the signal from 1 to 0 or 0 to 1. This injects false 
data into the legitimate message without the knowledge 
of the transmitting party and receiving party, resulting 
in an aircraft possibly reporting false position, 
identification, and trajectory. 
2.3. Proposed Solutions for ADS-B Security 
  
The security vulnerabilities of ADS-B have been 
well-known for a long time and the number of research 
studies focusing on it have been increasing steadily as 
the 2020 deadline for its full implementation draws 
closer. Sampigethaya et al. [6] analyze the security and 
privacy issues of aircraft communication systems, 
including ADS-B. The authors mention different 
methods of protecting ADS-B communication, from 
multilateration to cryptography. 
The variety of security issues make cryptography 
an appealing solution. While Sampigethaya et al. 
mention symmetric key encryption as an efficient 
approach, the need to pre-share keys makes the 
implementation completely inefficient. With symmetric 
key encryption ruled out by most researchers, other 
studies have looked into public key encryption as an 
alternative encryption solution. Wesson et al. [9] have 
noted asymmetric, elliptic curve cryptography as the 
most practical and effective cryptographic approach. 
However, cryptography as a whole - whether 
symmetric or asymmetric - remains impractical due to 
the burden of key management and the limited capacity 
of ADS-B transmissions. 
While cryptography is an appealing solution due to 
its ability to offer some level of protection for all 
possible attacks, even disregarding its implementation 
issues it is an inefficient solution due to the low threat 
of certain attacks. For example, eavesdropping is not 
necessarily an adversarial attack. On the contrary, the 
ability to track aircraft is a welcome one, as conveyed 
by the usefulness of online flight tracking websites 
such as Flight Radar 24 and Flight Aware. While 
eavesdropping can form the basis for the more 
sophisticated types of attacks, research should accept 
eavesdropping as a possibility and focus efforts on 
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preventing other attacks due to the difficulty to 
preventing eavesdropping without applying full 
encryption. 
With eavesdropping allowed and the inefficiency of 
encryption acknowledged, it is important to look into 
other methods of verifying messages in the air traffic 
communications network. Strohmeier et al. [8] separate 
the approaches towards ADS-B security into Secure 
Broadcast Authentication and Secure Location 
Verification, as shown in Figure 1. Secure location 
verification focuses on verifying location claims made 
by ADS-B participants. Location verification 
techniques are separated into the following groups: 
multilateration [4, 5], distance bounding, Kalman 
filtering [4], group verification, data fusion[4], and 
traffic modeling. 
3. Problem Description  
Despite the number of possible solutions for ADS-
B vulnerability, most proposals are limited, whether in 
ability or in implementation efficiency. The taxonomy 
of ADS-B security proposed by Strohmeier et al. [8] is 
used in this paper to categorize authentication 
solutions. This section discusses the problems of 
broadcast authentication to dismiss the need for 
encryption and to focus research on location 
authentication over data link authentication. However, 
not all location authentication techniques are sufficient 
enough to address ADS-B vulnerabilities and the 
remainder of this section will review issues found in 
location authentication strategies. 
3.1. Inefficiencies of Broadcast Authentication 
  
In accordance to the taxonomy proposed by 
Strohmeier et al., broadcast authentication consists of 
three branches: non-cryptographic schemes, public key 
cryptography, and retroactive key publication. Non-
cryptographic schemes consist of fingerprinting and 
random frequency hopping. Fingerprinting consists of 
using hardware, software, and/or wireless channel 
imperfections and characteristics to identify and 
authenticate legitimate users and devices. Random 
frequency hopping consists of changing frequencies to 
avoid jamming and eavesdropping. These two non-
cryptographic schemes are inapplicable to ADS-B 
security because fingerprinting has not been proven as 
a reliable way to identify between real and false traffic, 
while randomized frequency hopping requires pre-
shared secret codes, which is not scalable for 
widespread use within the air traffic transportation 
network. 
A public key infrastructure is similarly difficult to 
scale for such widespread use. Key distribution and 
key management pose significant challenges, with the 
requirement of a certificate authority and the 
possibility of producing an overwhelming amount of 
data link traffic due to certificate verification 
transactions. The possibility of retroactive key 
publication is also suggested as a variation on 
asymmetric cryptography. This strategy consists of 
senders retroactively publishing their keys and 
receivers authenticating the messages. However, this 
Figure 1. Taxonomy of ADS-B Security, by Strohmeier et al. [8]
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strategy is not feasible due to the possibility of packet 
loss and the delay of key release producing a further 
delay in authentication. 
3.2. Insufficiencies of Location Authentication 
  
In consideration of the inefficiency of the broadcast 
authentication strategies, it is worthwhile to focus on 
authenticating ADS-B location data. Strohmeier et al. 
list the following strategies for location authentication: 
multilateration, distance bounding, Kalman filtering, 
group verification, data fusion, and traffic modeling. 
This paper suggests a combination of these strategies 
for short-term secure location authentication, but the 
drawbacks of each individual technique is examined. 
Multilateration depends on two to four known 
locations cooperating with each other to determine the 
origin of an ADS-B signal by comparing the time the 
signal arrives at the different antennas. This technique 
is already being used in areas within the United States 
and Europe. However, because of the dependency on 
other verified sources, multilateration is not possible in 
open spaces, such as over oceans, which contradicts 
the intention of ADS-B. 
Distance bounding is a method that calculates the 
location of an aircraft based on the time it takes for the 
verifying body to challenge the supposed aircraft and 
the supposed aircraft to respond. This works 
particularly well when there is more than one verifying 
body, but it also results in multilateration’s problem of 
needing verified sources that may not be available in 
vast open spaces. In addition, attacks on distance 
bounding exist and the process takes too long to 
practically integrate in consideration of the high speed 
of air traffic. Finally, similar to the challenges of 
implementing certain cryptographic schemes, distance 
bounding requires the aircraft to be able to respond to 
the verifying body’s challenge. This means ADS-B 
equipment needs to be altered to support this 
technique. In the face of these disadvantages, this 
paper dismisses distance bounding as a practical 
strategy for location authentication. 
Kalman filtering is a technique that tests whether an 
aircraft’s motions are in line with its ADS-B intent. 
However, it is susceptible to attack [1, 4] and requires 
more storage and processing. This paper dismisses 
Kalman filtering as a practical strategy for location 
authentication due to its vulnerabilities. It can still be 
implemented in combination with other strategies - and 
in fact works very well to support multilateration 
precision - but will not be covered due to its low 
relative usefulness in contrast with other strategies. 
Group verification is a method of multilateration 
conducted by a group of aircraft in flight that verify 
other aircraft. This technique is supported by a study 
by Kovell et al. [4] that demonstrated that 91% of 
aircraft at a given time could be in a group large 
enough to take part in group verification. However, 
like distance bounding and cryptography schemes, the 
verification and trust process requires many additional 
messages, not to mention an overhaul of ADS-B’s 
inherent broadcast protocol. This invalidates group 
verification as a feasible security technique. 
Data fusion is a strategy that aggregates data from 
outside systems to check positional data from aircraft 
ADS-B. This works well with multilateration and is 
already being used. However, just like multilateration, 
data fusion contradicts the intention of ADS-B. While 
ADS-B is meant to be the foundation of NextGen, data 
fusion would require reliance on redundant systems 
such as the traditional primary radar system (PRS). 
ADS-B is intended to eventually phase out the PRS, 
and therefore data fusion is not a viable solution for 
long-term security. 
The final listed location authorization strategy of 
traffic modeling relies on past air traffic data and 
machine learning in order to create a traffic model for 
each ground station. This allows the detection of 
abnormal air traffic. However, due to the lack of 
research supporting the viability of using machine 
learning for traffic modeling, particularly as air traffic 
greatly increases, this paper dismisses the strategy in 
favor of a proposed location tracking and prediction 
strategy. 
4. Proposed Solution  
From the review of the location authentication 
strategies, we can see the advantages and limitations of 
multilateration and data fusion. This paper suggests the 
combination of multilateration with data fusion as a 
short-term solution for location authorization. 
However, because of data fusion’s reliance on 
redundant systems that are intended to be phased out as 
part of the next generation air traffic system, a location 
confirmation and tracking system is proposed for long-
term implementation. The proposed long-term solution 
consists of an interface that takes advantage of an air 
traffic controller’s ability to verify information while 
accepting control of aircraft and speaking directly with 
pilots. A secondary system keeps track of aircraft and 
the instructions they have been given, allowing for a 
backup record of controlled aircraft that a controller 
can quickly refer to in the case of a large influx of 
“ghost” aircraft or the sudden disappearance of aircraft. 
4.1. Multilateration as Short-Term Solution 
  
Multilateration uses verification sources on the 
ground in order to verify the location claims that 
aircraft makes. The main advantage of multilateration 
is that it is compliant with the ADS-B infrastructure 
that is already in place. It does not interfere with any 
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existing equipment. That is, it can be implemented on 
top of existing systems and will not obstruct the way 
they work. 
It must be noted however that multilateration would 
require redundant systems. It may not make sense to 
pay for redundant systems that do what ADS-B should 
be able to do on its own, but in view of ADS-B lacking 
any security features and the ease of implementing 
mult i laterat ion systems on top of exist ing 
infrastructure, the cost is reasonable for the sake of 
security. In addition, it’s important to remember that 
many flight and air traffic procedures already have 
redundant features in place to  
Multilateration systems do not process any 
sensitive data, but it would still be a good idea to 
implement securi ty features . For example, 
communication between the antennas should be 
properly encrypted and authenticated. Unlike ADS-B, 
multilateration would allow for this, so it should be 
taken advantage of. This will protect invalidated data 
from being injected and deleted in the network 
between multilateration antennas and central 
processing units. It would also be helpful to have 
systems that detect attempts to tamper with data and 
detect fraudulent identity claims. 
4.2. Data Fusion as Short-Term Solution 
  
Data fusion is one of the most important techniques 
for secure location verification. It involves the union of 
data from different sources, such as from radar systems 
and flight plans. Data fusion is valuable because it 
allows falsified data to be detected. The more sources 
of sensor data available, the harder it is for adversaries 
to implement attacks. 
For this technique, the legitimacy of various data 
sources is the most important aspect. For example, 
ADS-B data could be used for location verification but 
if the data is falsified, it could lead to even more 
interruptions due to multiple sources reporting different 
information. In this case, ADS-B is not being used as a 
source of data. An ideal source of data for data fusion 
in the short-term is primary radar systems. Primary 
radar systems are already established, so no further 
costs are needed to create new data sources. In 
addition, data from the radar systems is relatively 
trustworthy due to less vulnerabilities inherent to the 
system. Along with radar system data, flight plan data 
also needs to be verified. However, this data comes 
directly from pilots and airline companies. As long as 
steps are taken to ensure that flight plan data is not 
tampered with, it is a trustworthy source for data 
fusion. 
4.3. Combining Multilateration and Data 
Fusion for Short-Term Location Authorization 
  
Multilateration involves ground-to-air verification 
for location claims. Data fusion combines data from 
flight plans and the primary radar system to determine 
the validity of an aircraft’s path. These two techniques 
for location verification complement each other well, 
with multilateration verifying that an aircraft is where 
it claims to be and data fusion verifying that an aircraft 
is where it should be. Data fusion can depend on 
multilateration to ensure that the data it is processing is 
correct. 
The problem with multilateration and data fusion is 
that they are not viable solutions for long-term security. 
In addition, one of the goals of the aviation industry’s 
introduction of ADS-B is that it would eventually do 
away with the primary and secondary radar systems. 
Multilateration is not available over wide open spaces, 
especially over oceans, so it only offers a partial 
solution. On the other hand, ADS-B is capable of 
providing the information originally supported by 
primary and secondary radar systems, even over wide 
open spaces. While multilateration and data fusion 
work well for the present time, it would be valuable to 
consider long-term solutions that could aid in the 
secure verification of reported aircraft location. 
4.4. Location Tracking for Long-Term 
Implementation 
  
This paper proposes a location tracking and 
prediction system for long-term implementation as a 
solution to ADS-B security. This system would not 
require any changes in the systems already in place and 
would simply work as additional software on top of 
what is already in place for air traffic management 
systems. No extra equipment nor change in equipment 
would need to be implemented in aircraft systems. 
The proposed tracking system would rely on data 
from flight plans and ADS-B. In this sense, this is a 
method of data fusion. However, it would also be 
reliant on air traffic controller data. As aircraft fly 
between different airspace designations, they are 
transferred between air traffic facilities. As aircraft are 
handed off between facilities, air traffic controllers 
manually accept control of the aircraft. By seeing 
aircraft on their digital scope and communicating with 
the respective pilots, air traffic controllers create an 
authorization system themselves. The proposed 
tracking system would keep track of these aircraft as 
the air traffic controllers authenticate their location and 
identity. 
While a lone ghost aircraft does not pose a large 
problem to air traffic controllers, it can be imagined 
that a very large number of ghost aircraft suddenly 
appearing on a controller’s scope can cause extreme 
loss of situation awareness. With the location tracking 
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system in place, air traffic controllers will instead be 
able to view only the traffic that has been confirmed. In 
this sense, it is like a backup image of a system that the 
controllers can refer back to. Controllers can refer to 
the location tracking system, which will only show 
verified aircraft. This sort of system will be especially 
important if an attacker were to populate a scope with 
so many ghost aircraft that the screen is completely 
covered with them. In this case, the tracking system 
will provide a clear image of aircraft that have been 
confirmed by at least one air traffic controller to be in 
the airspace. This can also work to defend from the 
possibility of an attacker suddenly blocking ADS-B 
signals to create a disappearance of aircraft from the 
scope. Using data that has been previously verified by 
air traffic controllers, the tracking system would be 
able to show a picture of aircraft to show controllers 
where their last reported location is. This would 
additionally allow controllers to have an idea of where 
their aircraft are, decreasing the possible loss of 
situational awareness. 
This leads to another feature of the location 
verification system: location prediction. As air traffic 
controllers speak with aircraft, they verify information 
with the aircraft, such as aircraft type, speed, and 
intended path to an intended destination. This 
information is written down on strips of paper as 
controllers speak with aircraft. As this information is 
verified, the location verification system also takes in 
this information. This can be done through voice 
recognition, which is already implemented at air traffic 
control training centers. In addition, the information 
recorded via voice recognition could show up as a way 
for controllers to verify that it was correctly input into 
the location verification system. The verified 
information can be used by the system as a way to 
predict aircraft location in the case of a controller’s 
loss of situational awareness - such as if an attacker 
were to make all aircraft disappear from a controller’s 
scope or if information was falsified to make it look as 
if an aircraft was suddenly flying towards an object at 
very high speeds. The location verification system 
would simply keep track of intended path, intended 
destination, and controller instructions for aircraft 
direction and speed. Thus, a predicted path could be 
drawn from an aircraft to its destination, with the 
system showing a dot for the predicted location of an 
aircraft. Ideally, this dot would be in the same place as 
the aircraft. If an attacker were to make aircraft 
disappear from a scope or to falsify location or speed 
data, the controller would be able to refer to the last 
verified pathway in order to make an assessment about 
the true location of the aircraft. 
4.5. Solution Analysis 
  
The location authorization strategies previously 
mentioned were tested in a simulated environment 
based on live flight data. Local aircraft were tracked by 
processing ADS-B signals using MATLAB with RTL-
SDR radio hardware. Figure 2 displays an example of 
data that was retrieved for the simulation. This includes 
aircraft identification, position information, speed, 
heading, and flight plan. 
Several well-known Bayesian algorithms are often 
used as filtering algorithms to track objects whose 
dynamical behavior changes over time. The particle 
filter algorithm was chosen to track aircraft due to its 
suitability for nonlinear estimation and its use in signal 
processing. The algorithm consists of three parts: 
prediction of the state probability density function 
(PDF) using the system model, update via latest ADS-
Figure 2. Sample data taken from live ADS-B tracking, August 28, 2017.
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B data to modify the predicted PDF, and resampling to 
refine predictions. 
The prediction is made according to the following 
evolution equation: 
Pr = (PtGtGrλ2σ) / ((4π)3R4)                  (1) 
for which Pr is the received power, Pt is the 
transmitted power, Gr is the receiving antenna gain, Gt 
is the transmitting antenna gain, λ is the signal 
wavelength, σ is the target’s radar cross-section, and R 
is the range to the target. This equation allows for the 
target locations to be estimated. 
Huang et al. [3] additionally recommend the state 
equation: 
xt = f(xt-1) + vt-1                            (2) 
for the temporal evolution of the state vector xt, 
where f is the state transition function and vt is the 
process noise with zero mean. For the ADS-B system, 
the components of the state vector will be target 
locations for which an observation yt will be 
represented as: 
yt = h(xt) + nt ,                            (3) 
where h is the measurement function and nt is the 
measurement noise, with nt not correlated with vt. With 
this, the particle filter algorithm is implemented in the 
following steps:  
1. Particle generation: create N particles and 
associated weights (xnt-1, w(xnt-1))n=1,…,N  according to 
the uniform distribution. 
2. Prediction: particle propagation according to 
evolution equation (1). 
3. Update: use ADS-B data to compute the 
likelihood of each particle and update the weights of all 
the particles. 
4. Resample: after a predetermined number of 
iterations, take N samples based on the updated data in 
the previous step 
5. Reiterate: for t = t + 1, repeat these steps until the 
desired estimation error is received. 
Through these methods, a performance evaluation 
was conducted using MATLAB to verify the ability to 
track and predict aircraft location using the particle 
filter error coupled with verified input to simulate air 
Figure 3. ADS-B Reported Location vs. 
Predicted Location For One Aircraft
Figure 4. Particle Filter Error in Predicting 
Aircraft Location For One Aircraft
Figure 5. ADS-B Reported Location vs. 
Predicted Location For Three Aircraft
Figure 6. Particle Filter Error in Predicting 
Aircraft Location For Three Aircraft
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traffic control direction. This is in comparison to the 
real data obtained by the live ADS-B stream. Figure 3 
shows an example of one case of comparison. The true 
position indicated by ADS-B for one aircraft was 
compared with its predicted position through the 
particle filter algorithm and verified position through 
simulated air traffic controller confirmation. Figure 4 
shows the error rate made by the particle filter 
algorithm and simulated input in attempting to track 
and predict the aircraft’s location. Aside from one 
instance of notable error, the algorithm did fairly well 
and was within eight degrees of the aircraft’s true 
position. Figures 5 and 6 display the evaluation of 
three aircraft. Similar to the simulation for one aircraft, 
the algorithm and controller input do well in predicting 
the position of the aircraft. 
As Figures 3 to 6 show, there are occasional errors 
in the combined ability of the particle filter algorithm 
and air traffic controller simulation to predict aircraft 
position. However, these errors often do not greatly 
deviate by more than ten degrees. Figure 7 
demonstrates the particle filter algorithm errors for a 
set of one hundred aircraft. The overall degree of error 
remains small, with the majority of deviances below 5 
degrees and the instances of high error degree 
occurring at a lower rate as the number of aircraft 
sample size increases. 
The performance evaluation for location tracking 
and prediction via particle filter shows a lot of promise. 
Future research would include refinement of the 
algorithm for all dimensions of aircraft movement. In 
addition, implementation of real air traffic controller 
direction would likely increase dependability of the 
tracking and prediction algorithm in instances of 
adversarial attack. 
5. Conclusion  
ADS-B has been faulted for having no inherent 
security features. While this leaves the system 
vulnerable to various attacks, it is important to consider 
the viability of implementation for possible solutions. 
Suggestions for encryption or changes to aircraft 
systems are not realistic and lead to industry dismissal 
of security research. A location verification system 
would allow for a lightweight implementation that can 
provide air traffic controllers with a background 
reference they can refer to in case of attack. 
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